This paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in GDP, and are also more open to trade. These empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models explaining country formation and break up, and may account for the observed positive empirical relationship between trade openness and government size.
Introduction
A large body of literature deals with the economic determinants of government size, the determinants of trade openness and the relationship linking these two variables. Recent studies of the economics of country formation, by ; suggest that country size, government size and trade openness are interconnected. In particular, these papers have put forward two hypotheses:
1. Country size emerges from a trade-off between the economies of scale in supplying public goods in large countries, and the costs of cultural and ethnic heterogeneity, which may be increasing in the size of countries ). This result hinges critically on the assumption that, when you can share the costs of partially or completely non-rival public goods over larger populations, per capita expenditure on these goods is lower. 2. To the extent that market size influences productivity, large countries can 'afford' to be closed, while small countries face stronger incentives to remain open; conversely, as trade liberalizes, regional and cultural minorities can 'afford' to split because political borders do not identify the size of the market; therefore, smaller countries can enjoy the benefits of cultural homogeneity without suffering the costs associated with small markets ). This hypothesis points toward a negative relationship between country size and the degree of trade openness.
This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with these two ideas. We first show that government consumption, as a share of GDP, is smaller in larger countries. We next confirm the observation that small countries tend to be more open to international trade.
These two facts, taken together, may account for the observation that open countries have larger governments. In a recent and widely cited paper, Rodrik (1996) suggests a different link between openness and government size. He argues that open countries are more subject to external shocks, and therefore need a larger public sector to provide a stabilizing role. The present paper implies a different but not mutually exclusive explanation for the positive empirical relationship between openness and government size. Specifically, we argue that this link is mediated by country size. Hence, we cast some doubts on the direct link between openness and the share of government consumption. On the other hand, we find some evidence of a direct relationship between openness and the size of government transfers, a result which is in the spirit of Rodrik's hypothesis concerning the stabilizing role of governments in open economies. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the argument linking country size, openness and government share and presents some simple statistics on this point. Section 3 specifies and estimates a more complete set of equations for the determination of government size and trade openness. Section 4 discusses the evidence concerning the direct effect of openness on government size. The last section concludes.
Size, openness and public goods

Country size and trade openness
In several models with increasing returns to the scale of production, market size influences the level of economic activity. We can go back as far as Adam Smith, who argued that the size of the market imposes a constraint on the division of labor. Therefore, small countries that are closed to trade must experience a lower overall level of productivity. More recently, Murphy et al. (1989) propose a model of industrial development in which market size determines the extent to which firms can benefit from positive spillovers from each other. In this model, low income countries may need a 'Big Push' in order to move from a 'bad' equilibrium characterized by traditional, constant returns technologies to a 'good' equilibrium with modern, increasing returns industries. Ades and Glaeser (1994) ; Wacziarg (1997); provide empirical evidence consistent with these ideas: large countries experience smaller dynamic gains from trade than smaller countries.
In a world without international trade, political boundaries identify markets and countries face economic incentives to be large. On the contrary, the more a country can trade with the rest of the world, the less one can identify its political borders with the boundaries of its market. This observation has two implications: as the world trade regime becomes more and more open, various ethnic groups and regions will find it feasible to break away from their original countries; more generally, countries will find it less costly to split. Conversely, as the world becomes more and more populated by small countries, a liberal trade regime will find more and more supporters, precisely because small countries need trade to be economically viable. In other words, small countries face incentives to adopt open trade policies, precisely because they cannot benefit from access to larger markets unless they are open to trade. Thus, small countries can be expected to be more open to trade. document the effect of trade openness on country size, i.e., on secessions and mergers. They start from some well known facts. After the Second World War, in a period of rapidly increasing trade liberalization, the number of countries increased from 74 in 1946 74 in to 192 in 1995 74 in . In 1995 countries had less than 5 million inhabitants, 58 less than 2.5 million and 35 less than 500 000. More than half of the world's countries are smaller (in population) 1 than the state of Massachusetts. Many factors have contributed to this development, particularly the decolonization of Africa and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the trade regime is also important. For instance, several new small countries that emerged in the former Eastern bloc may not have chosen 2 independence in a world of heavy trade restrictions.
Other arguments also point to the fact that smaller countries should trade more, with causation running from country size to observed trade volumes directly, rather than through trade policy. A simple way to illustrate this type of argument is to undertake a simple thought experiment: Consider a large country living in autarky; if this country breaks up into smaller, free-trading units, each new unit will suddenly exhibit positive international trade.
Country size and the size of government
To the extent that there are fixed costs and economies of scale linked to partial or complete non-rivalry in the supply of public goods, smaller countries may have a larger share of government in GDP. For instance, there are fixed costs in establishing a set of institutions, a legal, monetary, and fiscal system. At least up to a point, when congestion effects become relevant, the costs of certain public goods grow less than proportionally to the size of the population (parks, libraries, roads, 3 telecom infrastructures).
To the extent that public goods are of a non-rival nature, increasing returns stem from the fact that, while the required level of provision is independent of population size (or grows less than proportionately to it in the case of partial non-rivalry), the cost of public goods can be spread over a larger pool of taxpayers in larger countries. The following simple example illustrates this point: Consider a country composed of N identical individuals with constant elasticity of substitution utility functions. The social planner maximizes the utility of a representative individual:
where C is private consumption and G is a non-rival public good. If the size of the population is N, Y is the exogenously given level of individual income and taxes are lump-sum, then the individual budget constraint will be:
The non-rival nature of the public good implies that every agent derives utility from consuming its aggregate supply G. However, each individual only pays a fraction 1 /N of the total cost. The first order condition obtained from maximizing equation (1) subject to equation (2) leads to the following optimal supply of G:
This implies that the ratio of government spending to aggregate GDP, which is our variable of interest, is the following: 
This expression is negative whenever a ,0. The less substitutable C and G (a → 2`), the more we approach the case of a Leontief utility function, and the greater the effect of population on the government spending to GDP ratio. On the contrary, in the case of a unit elasticity of substitution (a 50), the utility function approaches a Cobb-Douglas and the effect of country size becomes zero. As the elasticity of substitution keeps increasing (a 51 corresponds to linear utility), the effect of population becomes positive.
The intuition here is that an increase in country size has two effects: it reduces the per capita cost of public goods for a given level of provision, allowing more private consumption, which corresponds roughly to an income effect, and it raises the optimal level of provision (this is akin to a substitution effect). The more substitutable private consumption and public goods, the more agents will be willing to increase their level of consumption of the public good as a result of a decrease in its per capita cost. In this case, the substitution effect dominates and country size will actually be positively related to the ratio of government spending to GDP. The empirical test for whether increasing returns to public goods provision lead to a smaller government to GDP ratio is essentially a test of whether the right-hand side of equation (5) is negative.
In summary, we will test for an inverse relationship between the size of a country and the share of government consumption and investment, that is, we will bring equation 5 to the data. Note that this argument is most relevant for government consumption of goods and services, while transfers should not be included in the definition of government spending for which increasing returns should apply. Table 1 describes all the variables used in this paper. We measure openness mainly as the share of imports and exports over GDP. Our focus is on actual trade integration, which captures access to wider markets and also includes gravity effects, since we are interested in the fraction of the economy which actually 'interacts' with the rest of the world. However, we also examined the relationship between trade policy and country size, using tariff rates as well as other available indicators of outward orientation. To measure government size we employ a variety of variables, in order to assess where increasing returns, if any, play the dominant role. The main variable under study is the share of government consumption in GDP, excluding interest payments, transfers and public investment.
Some basic statistics
The first five columns of Table 2 present univariate regressions of various and to public investment. The last column of Table 2 displays a very strong correlation between country size and trade openness. In this simple univariate regression, the log of population exhibits a highly significant negative coefficient, and alone explains 35% of the variation in trade openness. We also used the log of GDP as a measure of country size, without significant changes in the results. In fact, the statistical significance of the negative relationship between government size and country size was even stronger when using the log of total GDP as a 5 measure of size.
Further empirical results
To account for the possibility that the univariate regression results presented in Section 2 are driven by omitted variables, we now specify more complete equations for the determination of government size and openness. Tables 3-6 contain least squares estimates for the government size and openness equations, regressed on country size (measured by the log of population) and a set of other controls.
Regressions for government size.
We start by considering the determinants of the share of government consumption in GDP. Table 3 presents estimates for the log of population when several controls are included sequentially, for the 1985-89 time period. The coefficient estimates are negative and significant in every specification, indicating the existence of increasing returns to the provision of public goods. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on size remains significant even after controlling for density and an exhaustive set of regional dummies. As expected, density enters negatively but does not eliminate the effect of size. The interpretation of the coefficient on the log of population, in such a regression, is the following: If we refer to column (6) of Table 3 , we can state that a 100% increase in population (doubling population) will lead to a 1.121*log2 points (0.77 points) decrease in public consumption as a percentage of GDP. In other words, just because Japan is twice the size of France means that it can 'save' 0.77 points of GDP on its government consumption outlays. This represents savings of 4% on the sample mean cost of public consumption on goods and services.
We also examined the robustness of the country size coefficient with respect to different time periods. Table 4 presents, across several time periods, the coefficients on country size obtained using the specification of column (6) in Table  3 . Our results suggest that the effect of country size has increased in time, both in terms of magnitude and in terms of statistical significance. While the point estimates are always negative, their absolute values and significance increased steadily since the 1960s. One possible interpretation for this finding is that many newly decolonized countries, in the 1960s, had yet to 'build up' their public sectors. As their governments converged to their equilibrium size, the effect of the fundamental determinants of government size started to play a larger and larger role. In particular, the negative effect of country size became more and more Note: t statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors, in parentheses.
Other controls (not shown) are the same as column (6) of Table 3. significant. Another hypothesis to explain this finding may simply be that government size may have been more poorly measured in the early periods, resulting in less precise estimates of the coefficients on the right hand side of the equation (note again that all point estimates remain negative throughout the periods; indeed, unsystematic measurement error in the dependent variable should not induce bias, only loss of precision). In any case, the coefficient on size for the full period average (1960-84) is negative and significant at the 90% confidence level. While the government consumption share is the most widespread measure of government size, other categories of spending may relate differently to country size. Indeed, while we should expect expenditures related to non-rival public goods such as roads, parks, and general administration to bear a negative relationship with country size, this cannot be expected to be the case for transfers, interest payments on the public debt and other forms of spending such as education and defense. These types of expenditures can be expected to be roughly proportional to a country's population, once their other determinants are held constant. Table 5 generally confirms these priors. Each of its columns corresponds to a different measure of government spending. Many of the control variables appear in every column, such as regional dummies, the log of per capita income as well as the measure of country size. The other controls differ slightly across equations, since the determinants of the various categories of government spending are likely to differ themselves. For instance, political instability, wars and ethnolinguistic fractionalization can be presumed to be strong determinants of defense spending. Similarly, urbanization rates can be presumed to determine government consump- Government consumption net of spending on defense and education bears a significantly negative coefficient, and this is not sensitive to the inclusion of any of the controls appearing in column (2) of Table 5 . Similarly, this result is robust with respect to different time periods (contrary to the case of total government 7 consumption examined above). However, when we move to the broadest available measure of government expenditure, which includes transfers and interest payments (column (3)), the effect of the log of population, while still negative, loses 7 Results for different specifications and different time periods are available upon request. some of its statistical significance. The magnitudes of these effects, for columns (1) through (3), are roughly equal. This is in line with theoretical predictions. For instance, adding transfers and interest payments to government consumption should not modify the estimated effect of country size if the added categories are unrelated to it (with respect to the size coefficient, this is equivalent to adding noise to the dependent variable, which should only result -as it does -in reduced precision for the estimates). We did not isolate transfers from other forms of expenditures, because the data for governement outlays devoted to transfers alone (available from the World Bank) are particularly poor and cover a small sample of countries. Estimates based on such data would therefore likely be characterized by much imprecision and measurement error.
Columns (4) and (5) contain estimates for government spending on defense and education (as a share of GDP) respectively. While defense spending seems unrelated to country size, the results for education related expenditures are somewhat more surprising. We indeed find evidence that larger countries tend to spend less on education, suggesting that some form of increasing returns may have found their way into this category of governmental activity. This may come as a surprise because education is not generally considered to be a non-rival good, so that its cost should rise roughly proportionately to population (for a fixed desired level of educational services). However, the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than for columns (1) through (3). Again, these results are not sensitive to the inclusion of any single one of the controls that appear in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 .
Lastly, column (6) examines the relationship between country size and the ratio of public investment to GDP. Although the coefficient on the log of population is negative, it is statistically insignificant and much smaller in magnitude than the corresponding estimate for 'broad categories' of government outlays (columns (1)- (3)). This is also true when any of the control variables appearing in the public investment equation are excluded. However, one should note that the cross-country data for public investment are probably characterized by significant measurement error.
In summary, we do find evidence of increasing returns to the provision of publicly supplied goods, for a broad class of categories of public spending. The strongest effects, as expected, appear in the case of public consumption.
Openness and country size
In order to assess the relationship between country size and trade openness, we regressed the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP on several determinants of trade flows, including the log of population. We should stress that arguments linking country size and openness point to the possibility that these variables 'cause' each other (Section 2). Hence, the coefficient on the log of population, in Table 6 , should not be interpreted as having any causal meaning. We just wish to illustrate Note: t statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors, in parentheses.
the negative relationship between openness and country size, and the fact that this relationship is not driven by some omitted determinant of openness. This is indeed confirmed by the point estimates presented in Table 6 . Country size is very significantly related to trade openness, even when a wide range of controls are included in the regression (on this point, see also Wacziarg, 1997). Furthermore, this result is not sensitive to the inclusion of any one of these controls, or to the 8 time period under consideration. The magnitude of the coefficient on the log of population suggests that, once other determinants of openness are held constant, doubling population is associated with a 9 percentage points reduction in the trade to GDP ratio. We also regressed various indicators of trade policy and outward orientation on measures of country size and other controls such as per capita income, and systematically found that smaller countries tended to have more open trade policies. Tariff rates are positively related to country size measured by the log of population, while measures of outward orientation developed by Sachs and Warner 9 (1995); Wacziarg (1997) were negatively related with country size.
Openness and government size
The fact that smaller countries have larger governments and are also more open to trade, as we argued above, may help account for the observation that more open countries have larger governments. Rodrik (1996) instead argues for a channel linking openness to government size directly. If more open countries are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks such as shifts in their terms of trade originating from world markets, and if government spending is capable of stabilizing income and consumption, then more open countries will need a larger government to play a stabilizing role.
Column (1) of Table 7 reproduces Rodrik's base specification. He runs a cross-sectional regression for the 1980-84 period, using the log of the government consumption share in GDP as the dependent variable. In addition to the log of openness, it includes eight control variables: the log of initial income, the log of the dependency ratio, the log of the urbanization rate and four regional dummies. This specification omits country size. We readily replicate Rodrik's results in column (1), and confirm that openness enters with a significantly positive 10 coefficient. When openness is excluded and the log of population is entered in its place, we obtain the result of Section 2, namely that the log of population enters with a negative sign. Column (3) adds the log of population in Rodrik's basic specification, and shows that, while openness remains significant, the measure of country size is not. However, the high degree of collinearity between openness and country size, documented above, makes it difficult to distinguish our channel (through country size) from Rodrik's direct effect. In fact, Rodrik does present a test of the hypothesis that the effect of openness on governement size may be driven by country size, and rejects this hypothesis. We found this rejection to be sensitive to small changes in the sample, the specification or the definition of the control variables. The next two columns in the table make this point clear.
Column (4) reports Rodrik's regression (on the year 1985) using not the log but the actual value of all the ratio variables, which is a more standard way to proceed (as, for instance, in the abundant cross-country growth literature). The result on openness now weakens substantially. Column (6) mirrors column (3), that is, it Table 7 Regression results: Replication of Rodrik's base regression (sensitivity to log-log specification) includes the log of population in the regression of column (4). The effect of openness disappears, while the log of population now seems to 'win the race' in terms of statistical significance. We also experimented with keeping the log specification for government size, while entering openness as a simple ratio; in this case, country size seems again to 'win the race'. We suggest that our results provide some evidence that the effect of openness on government size is largely driven by the omission of country size in column (3), but the high degree of collinearity between openness and country size makes it hard to tell the theories apart. Perhaps one way of reconciling the two channels is to argue that the country size effect should apply more specifically to government consumption, while the stabilizing role of government emphasized by Rodrik should apply more directly to governmental transfer payments. in Table 5 . The dependent variables are various components of government expenditures, all entering as a share of GDP. The dependent variable in column (1) is government consumption; population remains significant, while openness is totally insignificant, as in Table 6 . In column (2) the dependent variable is the government consumption share net of spending on defense and education. While the log of population here is still negative and highly significant, openness enters with the wrong sign (namely negative). This provides evidence in favor of our hypothesis, since this is precisely the category of government spending for which we would expect the greatest incidence of increasing returns. Column (3) considers total government current expenditures inclusive of transfers and interest payments. In this regression openness appears with a significantly positive coefficient, while the log of population bears an insignificant coefficient. The same pattern occurs for public investment (column (4)) and education (column (5)), while the share of expenditure on defense (column (6)) appears correlated neither with openness nor size.
Conclusion
This paper shows that country size is negatively related to government size, and that it is also negatively related to trade openness. These observations are consistent with recent economic models of country formation. Such theories ; ) view the determination of country size as arising from a trade-off: large countries can afford to have smaller governments (and therefore lower taxes) and they already benefit from a sizable market which reduces their need to be open to trade. However, they must bear the cost of cultural heterogeneity.
